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I. INTRODUCTION
Interpretation is a familiar feature of law and legal practice. For some
legal theorists, interpretation is a central—even foundational—aspect of
law. Despite many discussions of interpretation, in a variety of legal
theoretical contexts, there remains widespread disagreement over the
nature of interpretation in law. It may well be that the reason interpretation
remains a widely contested aspect of legal theory is that our very
conception of what counts as law depends on a proper understanding of
the role of interpretation in law.
* Distinguished Professor of Law (Camden) and Philosophy (New Brunswick),
Rutgers University. My thanks to Kim Ferzan, Peter Hacker, Andrew Halpin, Patrick S.
O’Donnell, and Jefferson White for comments on drafts of this Article. Justine Kasznica
provided outstanding research assistance. A version of this Article was presented to the
Oxford University Legal Theory Discussion Group, Mind and Society (Manchester) and
the law faculties at Southampton, Palermo and Luiss (Rome).

685

PATTERSON.DOC

6/6/2005 9:26 AM

I argue that interpretation is a parasitic activity in legal practice. In
other words, I want to disagree with those who make the case for
interpretation as a basic or fundamental feature of law.1 While
1. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). I anticipate that some will
take issue with my characterization of Dworkin’s interpretivism. One version of this
criticism is that Dworkin is not really making a semantic argument at all. Rather, his
claims are normative in nature and, thus, not susceptible to critique in the same manner
as, say, Stanley Fish. At a minimum, I think this is a contestable reading of the argument
in LAW’S EMPIRE. I will not make a sustained argument here because I have already
made the case elsewhere. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 76–98 (1996). I
will, however, record my complete agreement with Gerald Postema’s characterization of
a central problem with Dworkin’s argument. See Gerald Postema, “Protestant”
Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW & PHIL. 283, 288–89 (1987) (“[W]hile
[Dworkin] regards the activity of the practice [of law] as public and collective, he seems
to regard the enterprise of understanding that activity as private and individual . . . . I
shall argue that Dworkin’s theory thus interpreted fails to describe adequately participant
understanding of common social practices.”). Dworkin leaves us in no doubt when it
comes to the pervasive nature of interpretation in law. For Dworkin, there is no in
principle distinction between easy and hard cases:
We have been attending mainly to hard cases, when lawyers disagree whether
some crucial proposition of law is true or false. But questions of law are
sometimes very easy for lawyers and even for nonlawyers. It “goes without
saying” that the speed limit in Connecticut is 55 miles an hour and that people
in Britain have a legal duty to pay for food they order in a restaurant. At least
this goes without saying except in very unusual circumstances. A critic might
therefore be tempted to say that the complex account we have developed of
judicial reasoning under law as integrity is a method for hard cases only. He
might add that it would be absurd to apply the method to easy cases—no judge
needs to consider questions of fit and political morality to decide whether
someone must pay his telephone bill—and then declare that in addition to his
theory of hard cases, Hercules needs a theory about when cases are hard, so he
can know when his complex method for hard cases is appropriate and when
not. The critic will then announce a serious problem: it can be a hard question
whether the case at hand is a hard case or an easy case, and Hercules cannot
decide by using his technique for hard cases without begging the question.
This is a pseudoproblem. Hercules does not need one method for hard cases
and another for easy ones. His method is equally at work in easy cases, but
since the answers to the questions it puts are then obvious, or at least seem to
be so, we are not aware that any theory is at work at all. We think the question
whether someone may legally drive faster than the stipulated speed limit is an
easy one because we assume at once that no account of the legal record that
denied that paradigm would be competent. But someone whose convictions
about justice and fairness were very different from ours might not find that
question so easy; even if he ended by agreeing with our answer, he would
insist that we were wrong to be so confident. This explains why questions
considered easy during one period become hard before they again become easy
questions—with the opposite answers.
DWORKIN, supra, at 353–54. The problem with Dworkin is simple: he confuses the fact
that it is always possible that someone will need an interpretation (i.e., an explanation
that is usually given) with the false claim that we always interpret in order to understand.
Cf. Nicos Stavropoulos, Interpretivist Theories of Law, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF P HILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), at http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/
win2003/entries/law-interpretivist (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (explaining that interpretivism
is not fully determined by practice or values served by it).
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interpretation is certainly an important element of legal practice, it is an
activity that depends upon existing and widespread agreement among
legal practitioners with respect to most features of legal practice. In
short, interpretation is not the firmament of law.
I do not wish to deny that interpretation is an important aspect of the
practice of law. Rather, my aim is to clarify the role of interpretation in
law. But before we can begin to understand more clearly the nature of
interpretation in law, we must first clarify the nature of understanding,
for it is to understanding that interpretation owes its parasitic status.2
The need for interpretation arises from the firmament of praxis. That
is, interpretation in law arises from established forms of action that all
participants recognize and employ whenever they make, appraise, and
adjudicate claims about the state of the law. Interpretation is grounded
in a distinct form of discursive action that we recognize as legal in
nature. Thus, before we can truly understand the role of interpretation in
law, we must first explicate the particular form of understanding we
identify as legal.
Only with a clear view of the nature of understanding in law can we
then properly explicate the nature and scope of interpretation in law.
When we look at how participants in law engage in interpretation, the
activity can best be described by a few general principles. These
principles capture what it is that lawyers do when they, of necessity,
interpret the law.
This Article is divided into three principal parts. In Part II, I reprise
an argument that myself and others have made about the “logical” status
of interpretation. I add to the discussion of the role of interpretation in
understanding by making the claim that interpretation is a parasitic
activity, the efficacy of which is dependent upon understanding already
being in place.

2. All interpretation presupposes understanding. No one could interpret the
following: Nog drik legi xfom. The term first has to be translated (and, contra Quine,
translation is not interpretation) or deciphered before interpretation takes place. W.V.
QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 51–55 (1969). We interpret an
utterance when we choose between different ways of understanding it. Legal interpretation
is the activity of deciding which of several ways of understanding a given provision is
the correct or preferable way of understanding. This is precisely the sort of activity
Wittgenstein has in mind when he writes: “we ought to restrict the term ‘interpretation’
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
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In Part III, I explicate what it means to understand the law. Again
drawing on my earlier work,3 I explain that understanding law is a
matter of being the master of a technique, specifically, a technique of
argument. I describe the forms of legal argument in detail and make the
case that the use of these argumentative forms is the nerve of law.
The forms of argument are central to any understanding of law and
legal practice. But the forms of argument conflict, and when they do,
the need for interpretation arises. Part IV contains a discussion of three
cases that illustrate both the use of the forms of argument and the way in
which their conflict requires interpretation. I conclude that interpretation
in law is best explained by three principles. These are: minimal mutilation,
coherence and generality. When the forms of argument conflict, we
must choose between competing resolutions of their conflict. In my
discussion of cases where the forms of argument conflict, I will show
how the principles of interpretation that I identify provide a perspicuous
account of what lawyers do when they interpret the law.
II. UNDERSTANDING IS NOT INTERPRETATION
It has now become quite popular to explicate understanding in terms
of interpretation. Interpretivists believe that interpretation is the most
perspicuous way to explicate or explain the phenomenon of human
understanding. Interpretation knows no disciplinary boundaries. From
philosophy to psychology to anthropology and the natural sciences,
interpretation plays a central role in the explanation of human action.
So, how do interpretivists account for the phenomenon of human
understanding? Interested as we are in law, consider the views of a
leading proponent of interpretivism, Stanley Fish. Fish developed the
theory of Reader-Response Criticism—the idea that in the act of reading,
the reader creates the meaning of the text.4 This view is a function or
corollary of Fish’s general philosophical views about the nature of
meaning, which he expresses thus:
All shapes are interpretively produced, and since the conditions of interpretation
are themselves unstable—the possibility of seeing something in a “new light,” and
therefore of seeing a new something, is ever and unpredictably present—the
shapes that seem perspicuous to us now may not seem so or may seem
differently so tomorrow. This applies not only to the shape of statutes, poems,
and signs in airplane lavatories, but to the disciplines and forms of life within
which statutes, poems, and signs become available to us.5
3. See PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 86–88 (explaining that understanding is the
act of properly responding to a request).
4. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 21–67 (1980) (developing
the theory of affective stylistics).
5. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
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In accounting for our understanding of statutes, poems, and airplane
lavatory signs, Fish posits an act of interpretation interposed between the
object of our understanding and our grasp of its meaning. The interpretive
act mediates between the thing we seek to understand and our grasp of
its meaning. Interpretation makes understanding possible. Of course,
there is often disagreement over the meaning of texts, especially legal
texts. Fish thinks that interpretation can account for this phenomenon.
In accounting for the divergent perspectives of the majority and
dissenting opinions in Riggs v. Palmer,6 Fish writes:
[I]f it is assumed that the purpose of probate is to ensure the orderly devolution
of property at all costs, then the statute in this case will have the plain meaning
urged by the defendant; but if it is assumed that no law ever operates in favor of
someone who would profit by his crime, then the “same” statute will have a
meaning that is different, but no less plain. In either case the statute will have
been literally construed, and what the court will have done is prefer one literal
construction to another by invoking one purpose (assumed background) rather
than another.7

For Fish, interpretive assumptions are the bridge between a statutory
text and our grasp of its meaning. Interpretive assumptions mediate or
make possible our grasp of the meaning of the New York Statute of
Wills. Without these interpretive assumptions, the requirements of the
statute would elude us. But, according to Fish, the interpretive assumptions
of the majority and the dissent were different. It is due to these
differences in interpretive assumptions that the court divided on the
question of the meaning of the rules articulated by the statute. Thus, per
Fish, interpretation not only accounts for human understanding, it
accounts for disagreement in understanding as well.
There is nothing in Fish’s account of either understanding or
disagreement that can withstand scrutiny. Fish’s signature move is the
slide from the fact of interpretive dispute to the (false) conclusion that
interpretive disputes are best explained by the “fact” that the disputants
lack a common ground of understanding. Explicating the common
ground of understanding puts us on the road to a better understanding of
interpretation.

THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 302

(1989).
6. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a man could not
receive his grandfather’s estate because the principle that no one should be permitted to
profit from his own wrong supersedes the applicable statutes).
7. FISH, supra note 4, at 280.
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With this in mind, consider Wittgenstein:
A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign post leave no doubt open
about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I
have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But
where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its
finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post,
but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground— is there only one
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no
room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes
not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical
one.8

Without a practice of following it—a way of acting—the signpost, by
itself, leaves considerable room for doubt. There are as many potential
ways of following the signpost as there are possible conventions for
determining how it is to be used and what counts as following it. But
once a convention for following signposts is adopted, a background of
understanding evolves. It is against this background that the need for
interpretation arises.
In explicating understanding, interpretation is a nonstarter. Even if we
were to grant the interpretivist his premise that all understanding
involves interpretation, the interpretivist position collapses on its own
terms. If all understanding is interpretation, then all interpretation is
itself in need of interpretation. That is, if understanding a rule, symbol,
or sign is a matter of an act of interpretation standing between the
interpreter and the thing interpreted, there is no reason why this same
logic should not apply to the interpretation itself. Wittgenstein’s point is
not to deny understanding. Rather, his argument is that interpretation
cannot explicate the very idea of understanding because it gives rise to
an infinite regress of interpretations (the Regress Argument).9 In the
end, interpretation obscures rather than illuminates the phenomenon of
human understanding.
In addition to the infinite Regress Argument, Wittgenstein advances a
second argument, what Meredith Williams calls the “Paradox of
Interpretation.”10 First, Wittgenstein:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can
also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor
conflict here.11

8.
9.
10.
11.
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The Regress Argument undercuts our ability to prefer one interpretation
over another. By contrast, the Paradox of Interpretation argument shows
that no matter what action we deem “correct,” we can interpret the rule
in question in such a way that the action can be made either to accord
with the rule or not. Williams sums up the situation thus:
The Regress Argument shows that the view of objectified meaning as embodied
in decision, formula, or any other candidate for the role cannot account for the
necessity of rules, for the fact that rules constrain the behavior of the agent. The
Paradox shows that the view cannot account for the normativity of rules, for the
fact that there is a substantive distinction between correct and incorrect. There
is nothing in the mind of the agent or in the behavior of the agent that shows
what rule he is following, so long as we think of rules as embodying objectified
meaning. In sum, there is no explanatory role (via the Paradox) nor epistemic
role (via the Regress) for objectified meaning to play.12

If interpretation is a dead end, how do we explain the fact that we do
understand signposts and that we do grasp the requirements of all sorts
of norms (that is, follow rules)? Wittgenstein rejects the idea of
interpretation as a necessary mediating device between a rule and our
grasp of its requirements. His point is not only that interpretation is a
logically incoherent explanation of understanding. He goes further, arguing
against the very picture of understanding embraced by interpretivists.
For Wittgenstein, nothing stands between a rule and what counts as
following a rule (that is, correct action). And yet, we still do not have a
clear picture of the nature of understanding. Precisely what, we may still
ask, does understanding consist of?
Wittgenstein’s answer is twofold: technique13 and practice.14 We
show our understanding of a concept when we use the concept correctly.
The “giving of a correct explanation is a criterion of understanding.”15
12. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 161.
13. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 199 (“To understand a language means to be
[the] master of a technique.”).
14. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, 2 WITTGENSTEIN: RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY
136 (1985).
15. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING
667 (1980).
[G]iving a correct explanation is a criterion of understanding, while the
explanation given is a standard for the correct use of the expression explained.
Correspondingly, using an expression in accordance with correct explanations
of it is a criterion of understanding, while understanding an expression
presupposes the ability to explain it.
Id. Thus, when a lawyer is asked why two persons are required to witness a will, the
connection between attestation and validity will be explicated, thereby demonstrating the
lawyer’s understanding of the concepts.

691

PATTERSON.DOC

6/6/2005 9:26 AM

Correct understanding is not a function of something that goes on in our
head (for example, a private act of interpretation or translation). Concept
possession is the demonstrated ability to participate in the manifold
activities in which the concept is employed (for example, rule following).16
Interpretation is a nonstarter because interpretation draws our attention
away from the techniques that make understanding possible. Correct
and incorrect forms of action are immanent in practices. Thus, correct
forms of action cannot be imposed on a practice, by interpretation or
otherwise. It is only when we master the techniques employed by
participants in a practice that we can grasp the distinction between
correct and incorrect action.17
But where does this leave interpretation? If understanding—knowing
how to engage in a practice—is exhibited in action, what role is there
for interpretation? Again, Wittgenstein is instructive here. When it
comes to interpretation, we can see that interpretation depends upon
understanding—unreflective action—already being in place.18 We should, as
Wittgenstein argues, “restrict the term ‘interpretation’ to the substitution
of one expression of the rule for another.”19 Interpretation is an
activity—one that not only depends upon understanding already being in
place, but an activity that is actuated by a breakdown or failure in
understanding. In short, interpretation is a therapeutic, not foundational,
activity.
III. UNDERSTANDING LAW: THE GRAMMAR OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
I have argued that interpretation is an activity that depends upon
understanding. I have said that understanding—be it of law or any other
human practice—is a matter of being the master of a technique. But
what is the technique grasped by a competent practitioner of law, and in
what does mastery of such technique consist?

Id.

16. See WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 176.
The rule as formula, the standard as chart, or the paradigm as an instance have
no normative or representational status in their own right. They have this
status only in virtue of the way the formula or the chart or the instance is
used. It is the use that creates the structured context within which sign-posts
point, series can be continued, orders obeyed and paradigms be exemplary.
Only then can we see a particular action as embodying or instancing a
grammatical structure. In short, the mandatory stage setting is social practice.

17. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT 13 (1994) (“[T]he meaning of
a linguistic expression must determine how it would be correct to use it in various
contexts. To understand or grasp such a meaning is to be able to distinguish correct from
incorrect uses.”).
18. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 219 (“When I obey a rule, I do not chose. I obey
the rule blindly.”).
19. Id. at § 201.
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The nerve of law is argument. Facility in legal argument is the
measure of the degree to which one has mastered the grammar of
justification that is central to the practice of law. The grammar of legal
argument is immanent in the practice of law. By immanent, I mean to
say that law is an intersubjective practice wherein participants coordinate
their behavior through the employment of a grammar of appraisal that is
a constitutive feature of the practice itself.20
The fundamental form of expression in law is assertion. Argument in
law begins with an assertion that something is the case—true—as a
matter of law. Everything from a claim that a statute is unconstitutional
to averment that a contract is unenforceable are all examples of legal
assertions, claims that the purported proposition is true as a matter of
law.
Lawyers appraise the truth and falsity of legal assertions through
forms of legal argument. The forms of argument are themselves neither
true nor false. Rather, the forms of legal argument are the means by
which lawyers show the truth and falsity of legal propositions.21 The
forms of argument are the grammar of legal argument. They are
immanent in the sense that they make possible the assertion of claims for
the truth of legal propositions which are then disputed, evaluated, and
judged by all who are competent in their use (technique).22
There are six forms of legal argument in the American system of law.
While some are more familiar than others in different departments of
law,23 these six forms comprise a complete list of the argumentative
tools of American law. The forms of argument in law are:
Textual: taking the words of an authoritative legal text (e.g., a
constitution, statute, contract or trust) at face value, i.e., in
accordance with their ordinary meaning;
20. In short, I agree with Jules Coleman that law is a conventional practice
“sustained by the behavior of participants.” JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF
PRINCIPLE 99 (2001). I believe an account of the forms of argument, and the way the
forms of argument are used to show the truth of legal propositions, is the best
explanation of the practice of law.
21. “[P]ropositions of law are typically statements not of what ‘law’ is but of what
the law is, i.e. what the law of some system permits or requires or empowers people to
do.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 247 (2d ed. 1994).
22. Robert Brandom describes well the project of joining the assertoric and the
normative. See BRANDOM, supra note 17, at 167 (“What is it we are doing when we
assert, claim, or declare something?”).
23. The phrase “departments of Law” is Dworkin’s. See DWORKIN, supra note 1,
at 250–54.
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Doctrinal: applying rules generated from previously decided cases
(precedents);
Historical/Intentional: relying on the intentions of the Framers
(constitution), legislature (statute), or parties to an agreement
(contract);
Prudential: weighing or assessing the consequences (in terms of
“costs”) of a particular rule;
Structural: inferring rules from relationships created by the structures
created by the Constitution or statute; and
Ethical: deriving rules from the moral ethos established by the
Constitution or by statute.24
I have said that the forms of legal argument in the American practice
of law are employed to show the truth and falsity of legal propositions.
While this is certainly true, I need to say more about the argumentative
framework within which the forms of legal argument are immanent.
Once this structure is articulated, I can then explicate the nature of
understanding in law as a prelude to my discussion of the role of
interpretation in law.
As mentioned, legal argument begins in assertion. An assertion in law
is a claim that a given proposition is true as a matter of law. Consider this
proposition: p = “The contract between Smith and Jones is unenforceable.” I
will call this proposition a Claim because it is asserted as a correct or
true proposition. Before we can assess the truth or falsity of the Claim,
we need to know what it is about the contract between Smith and Jones
that might lead one to assert that the contract is unenforceable.
What we seek is a Ground, a reason (for example, a fact) that connects
the Claim of unenforceability with some aspect or feature of the contract
by virtue of which the contract is allegedly unenforceable. Suppose
Smith is fourteen years of age. This fact is the Ground for the Claim that
the contract is unenforceable. But what is it that makes this so? In other
words, in virtue of what are the Claim and Ground joined such that the
Ground supports the Claim (that is, makes it true)?
The answer to this last question is a Warrant. The Warrant makes the
Ground significant vis-à-vis the Claim. The Warrant is the means by
24. The six forms of argument in American law, paraphrased in modern terms
here, were first explicated by Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982). Structural argument in the constitutional context was
first articulated by Charles Black. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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which we can say with certainty that the Ground is a legally relevant
reason for concluding that the Claim is true as a matter of law. But
Warrants are not self executing. For Warrrants to be meaningful, there
must be ways of construing Warrants that make Warrants meaningful. I
shall refer to these as Backings.
The forms of legal argument are the Backings for Warrants, the
grammar of legal justification with which we show the truth and falsity
of Claims from the legal point of view. The following schema depicts
these relationships explained in the preceding paragraphs: 25
CLAIM

GROUND

WARRANT

BACKINGS
Forms of Argument:
Textual; Doctrinal; Historical;
Prudential; Structural and Ethical

With this schema in view, let us work through the question whether p
is a true proposition of law. Obviously, Smith’s status as a minor is the
Ground for the Claim that p is true. If the Claim arose in a jurisdiction
where the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is deemed to be the
controlling law on this question, a textual argument that references the

25. The framework that follows (Claim, Ground, Warrant, Backings) is taken from
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING 23–67 (1979). The
approach was originally advanced in STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE USES OF
ARGUMENT (1958).
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operative provision26 would be sufficient to show the truth of p. In
addition to the relevant Restatement text, there would no doubt be
precedent construing the rule in question (doctrinal argument), noting
exceptions, and describing qualifications. Taken together, the textual
and doctrinal arguments show the truth of p. It is through the use of
these forms of argument that we are able to say that p is true.
The normativity of law—the distinction between correct and incorrect
assertions—is a matter of the proper use of the forms of legal argument.
The forms of argument are the (immanent) grammar of legal justification.
Understanding in law is best explained as a disposition on the part of
individuals to employ the forms of argument in appropriate ways as
context requires.27 The normativity of law assures objectivity in legal
judgment.28 Meaning—the basis of objectivity—is made possible by the
harmony in action and judgment of participants in legal practice over
time. Most importantly, it is in virtue of what participants in legal
practice have in common29 that normativity and objectivity are possible.
IV. INTERPRETATION IN LAW
Interpretation is a constitutive feature of legal practice. Notwithstanding
its importance within legal practice, interpretation is an activity that is
dependent on understanding already being in place. The need for
interpretation arises when our conventional ways of understanding break
down. This occurs, in law, when our use of the forms of legal argument
“is in some way rendered problematic and thrown in doubt.”30 How
does understanding in law break down, and how does interpretation
serve to repair the fabric of understanding?
Lawyers use the forms of argument to appraise claims about what is
true as a matter of law. In many cases (we may call them easy cases),
the relevant forms of argument all point to a single conclusion. But the
forms of argument do conflict, and, when they do, the tension must be
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (describing capacity
to contract).
27. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 177 (describing a disposition as the ability to
act appropriately under the circumstances).
28. See Dennis Patterson, Normativity and Objectivity in Law, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 325, 356 (2001) (showing how normativity arises from a practice of argument with
criteria for appraising assertions).
29. Of course, this is directly contrary to the argument made by Ronald Dworkin.
See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 250–54 (showing the compartmentalization of the
departments of law); Postema, supra note 1, at 283, 288–89 (making the case for the
intersubjective nature of understanding).
30. James Tully, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices
of Critical Reflection, in THE GRAMMAR OF POLITICS: WITTGENSTEIN AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 17, 39 (Cressida J. Heyes ed., 2003).
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resolved. Resolving this tension is the activity of legal interpretation.31
It is in the act of interpretation that the fabric of law is repaired, thereby
enabling practitioners to go on with the practice. I shall now discuss
three cases to illustrate these points.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Let us start with a case familiar to all students of legal theory, Riggs v.
Palmer.32 Having executed a valid will, Francis Palmer intended to
leave the bulk of his estate to his grandson, Elmer.33 Upon the remarriage
of his widower grandfather, Elmer feared he would lose his inheritance.34
To prevent this turn of events, Elmer killed his grandfather by poison.35
There was no dispute about the requisite statute at the center of issue
in the case. The New York Statute of Wills articulated what all probate
statutes required: where there is a valid will, a dead testator, and a
named beneficiary, the latter is given the testator’s property according to
the dictates of the will.36 The proposition of law to which the parties
gave their attention is simple: Elmer is entitled to his grandfather’s
property in accordance with the dictates of his grandfather’s will. Elmer’s
argument was grounded in the language of the New York Statute of
Wills.37 Before we consider the arguments for and against the asserted
proposition of law, a few preliminary remarks are in order. They
concern the concept of understanding and its relationship to the forms of
argument discussed earlier. As argued above, understanding is exhibited
by participants in legal practice in the unreflective employment of forms
of argument to show the truth of legal propositions. To see this,
consider a case where murder is not an element of the facts—the normal
probate context. Once validated by the probate court, the will of the
testator dictates the devolution of property of the testator. This
requirement is gleaned from a straightforward reading of the Statute of
Wills. In short, textual argument is sufficient to show the truth of the
proposition that the beneficiary of a valid will is to be given property in
31. Conflict among the forms of argument is a significant but not exhaustive
aspect of interpretation in law.
32. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 189.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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accordance with the dictates of the will. What turns a case of understanding
into one where the need for interpretation arises?
The need for interpretation is actuated by facts. In Riggs, the actuating
fact was the murder of the testator by his grandson. But why is this fact
an actuating event? Not only does the majority opinion show why the
murder actuates the need for interpretation, the opinion shows how the
state of the law explains the legal (that is, interpretive) significance of
the murder. In other words, we need to explain how understanding (that
is, the unreflective act of probating the will in the normal course of
things) broke down as the court tried to come to terms with the
significance of the murder as the event that precipitated the breakdown
in understanding.
The majority opinion in Riggs is a sophisticated doctrinal argument.
As Professor Dworkin has taught us, the opinion makes good use of the
common law maxim: no man shall profit from his own wrong.38 But
there is more to the opinion than mere recitation of an equitable maxim.
When we look at the ways in which Judge Earl showed the true state of
the law, we see why the facts themselves make it clear that a
straightforward reading of the requisite statute was all but impossible.
The majority opinion begins in classic fashion with the distinction
between law and equity. The distinction is embraced in full measure by
the common law systems of both the United States and England and can
be traced back to Aristotle. The sheer breadth and diversity of classic
writers on the role of equity39 within all departments of law should cause
an educated legal mind to experience a sense of unease when confronted
with the facts in Riggs.
Having shown how the no man shall profit from his own wrong
principle is a constitutive feature of law in the most general way (that is,
the law and equity distinction), Judge Earl then demonstrated the reach
of the principle throughout varied departments of law. Citing cases from
the law of wills and insurance, Earl made a strong case for the
proposition that precedents both directly on point (that is, the law of
wills), as well as those from related departments of law, support an
exception to the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute. That is,
Earl made a doctrinal argument to the effect that the words of a valid
legislative enactment (here, the Statute of Wills) are to be given their
normal force and effect unless there is some exception demonstrated by
the facts. In short, Judge Earl did not change the law; he clarified it (by
38. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14–45 (1977); DWORKIN,
supra note 1, at 15–20.
39. In its opinion, the majority cites Puffendorf, Bacon, and Blackstone, among
other legal thinkers. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
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pointing to an underlying and well-established legal principle).40
By contrast, Judge Gray, in dissent, argued for a straightforward
reading of the words of the statute. Claiming that the court was “bound
by the rigid rules of law,”41 Gray argued that Elmer is being twice
punished for his offense.42 In a clever rebuttal to Judge Gray, the majority
pointed out that he begged the question of whether Elmer was entitled to
receive his victim’s property under the will. The point was that the very
question before the court was whether the property rightfully belonged
to Elmer or not. Judge Gray did not seem to notice his error.
What does Riggs teach us about interpretation in law? First, in terms
of the forms of argument, it is clear that without the complicating factor
of the murder of the testator, the textual argument is decisive. Without
the murder of the testator, it is true as a matter of law that Elmer was
entitled to receive his grandfather’s property according to the dictates of
the Statute of Wills. It is only when the complication of the murder is
added to the facts that lawyers dispute the true state of the law.
How did Judge Earl persuade enough of his colleagues to see the law
as he did? Three factors suggest themselves. First, the majority opinion
did no damage to the existing state of the law. I will call this the
interpretive principle of minimal mutilation.43 In other words, deciding
against Elmer did not put in question the efficacy of any other element
of the New York Statute of Wills. Second, through its decision, the
majority demonstrated that its conclusion was consistent with everything
else it knew to be true about the law of wills. I shall refer to this as
coherence.44 Finally, the opinion shows how a decision against Elmer
comports with similar decisions in other departments of law. I shall
40. See FISH, supra note 4, at 327 (“Interpretation is not the art of construing but
the art of constructing.”).
41. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 193 (“[T]o concede appellants’ views would involve the imposition of an
additional punishment or penalty upon [Elmer].”) (Gray, J., dissenting).
43. See W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 66–67 (2d ed. 1978)
(discussing the virtue of conservatism). See also GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY 12 (1996) (“It is rational to
make the least change in one’s view that is necessary in order to obtain greater coherence
in what one believes.”) (citations omitted). Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 147 (1994) (discussing reasoned elaboration).
44. The idea of coherence is apt. See CONAL CONDREN, THE STATUS AND APPRAISAL
OF CLASSIC TEXTS 148 (1985) (“[A]t its most general level, coherence refers to the ways in
which parts are interconnected to form a whole; and at a similar level of generality, the
appraisive category of coherence is an abridgment of the range of questions one asks of a
text in terms of its parts and the closeness of their interrelationships.”).
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refer to this aspect as generality.45 Taken together, minimal mutilation,
coherence, and generality are the three aspects of the majority’s opinion
that support the notion that its interpretation of the law is more
persuasive than that offered by the dissenting opinion.
More important than the particulars of the majority and dissenting
opinions is the fact that neither advanced any theory of legal interpretation.
Of course, it is always possible to elevate a form of argument into a
theory if that means relentless adherence to a single form of argument.46
However, the move to theory hides the tension felt by practitioners of
law as they struggle to persuade one another that their choice of how to
go on with the practice is correct. To see such a struggle as a competition of
theories obscures this important aspect of the practice.
B. Contract Law
The discernment of legal meaning is a fundamental feature of law.
Contracts, trusts, wills, and constitutions all come to us in the form of
written instruments. How lawyers construe texts to decide their meaning
is a complex and sophisticated undertaking. Interestingly, the forms of
argument—previously explained as the means by which lawyers show
the truth of legal propositions—are the same whether the document is a
contract or a constitution. In fact, it was the existence of the forms of
argument at common law that made the American innovation of a
written constitution workable.47
Contracts usually take the form of a writing because the parties wish
to hold one another to their bargain. But sometimes the writing—no
matter how clear it may be—fails to settle the question of the parties’
agreement. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. is
illustrative.48 A building owned by an Iowa corporation whose president
was a farmer was burglarized. The thieves made off with chemicals, office
equipment, and shop equipment valued at approximately $10,000.49 The
stolen chemicals, which constituted the bulk of the value of the lost
items, had been stored in a locked interior room in the warehouse.50
45. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 43, at 73 (“The wider the range of application of
a hypothesis, the more general it is.”).
46. For an exquisite example see MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 179–87
(1988) (reducing all the forms of constitutional argument to prudential argument). For
discussion of this point, see Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233
(1989) (reviewing TUSHNET, supra).
47. See CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 24, at 5 (“Since the Constitution
was a written law, it had to be construed, and this was to be done according to the
prevailing methods of legal construction.”).
48. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id.
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Interestingly, there were no visible marks on the exterior of the building,
nor was there any sign of tampering upon the Plexiglas door to the
warehouse. The court described the facts as follows:
There were truck tire tread marks visible in the mud in the driveway leading to
and from the plexiglas door entrance to the warehouse. It was demonstrated this
door could be forced open without leaving visible marks or physical damage.
There were no visible marks on the exterior of the building made by tools,
explosives, electricity or chemicals, and there was no physical damage to the
exterior of the building to evidence felonious entry into the building by force
and violence.51

The insurance policy defined burglary as:
[T]he felonious abstraction of insured property (1) from within the premises by
a person making felonious entry therein by actual force and violence, of which
force and violence there are visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity
or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the premises at the
place of such entry.52

Following the text of the insurance policy, this loss was not covered,
as the burglar left no visible marks on the exterior door. And yet, the
Iowa Supreme Court held to the contrary. Its reason for doing so is a
lesson in the art of interpretation in law.
The dissent makes the obvious textual argument: “We may not—at
least we should not—by any accepted standard of construction meddle
with contracts which clearly and plainly state their meaning simply
because we dislike that meaning, even in the case of insurance
policies.”53 In contract law, due to the emphasis on writing, textual
argument often enjoys supremacy among the forms of argument. And
yet, there are many examples where the plain meaning of the text yields
to other considerations.
The majority opinion evinces no lack of appreciation for the power of
textual argument.54 But the majority uses an historical argument to
make the case—ultimately persuasive—that the specific language of the
contract cannot control the ultimate decision of what rights the parties
have under their agreement. In constitutional law, and in the interpretation
of statutes, appeal is made to the announced intentions of ratifiers or
legislators in interpreting the present meaning of constitutional or
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. (quoting trial court) (emphasis added).
Id. at 183 (LeGrand, J., dissenting).
Id. at 173–75.
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legislative provisions. Where circumstances change, the outcome of
decisions may well be different from those originally contemplated.
In characterizing the nature of the contractual process, the majority
writes: “[m]any of our principles for resolving conflicts relating to
written contracts were formulated at an early time when parties of equal
strength negotiated in the historical sequence of offer, acceptance, and
reduction to writing. The concept that both parties assented to the
resulting document had solid footing in fact.”55 But the course of history
moved away from the era of parties of equal strength bargaining freely.
It is this historical change that, in the view of the majority, merits an
outcome not contemplated by a mere reading of the contractual text.56
The great change that underlies the majority’s historical argument is
the rise of standard form contracts.57 Presented on a take it or leave it
basis, insurance contracts present the buyer in need of coverage with no
options and no ability to negotiate terms (for example, the definition of
burglary) or any other material element of the contract. The contract is,
in effect, composed of boilerplate terms to which there is no real assent
at all.
Owing to the fact that terms cannot be negotiated, purchasers of
policies rarely read the terms of the document with care. Of course, any
purchaser of insurance will have reasonable expectations about the
scope and limits of coverage. These expectations, the majority argued,
require a different approach to the question whether the purchaser
assented to the terms offered in the insurance policy. The majority
concluded, because of the fact “that modern insurance companies have
turned to mass advertising to sell ‘protection’”58 that the law required
that the “reasonable expectations” with respect to coverage be of greater
importance than the ordinary meaning of contract terms.59
How did the majority resolve the conflict between the textual and
historical arguments? First, the court showed how the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is an established feature of insurance law,60
thereby demonstrating coherence within the immediate department of
law. Minimal mutilation and coherence are both at work, building a
persuasive interpretation. But the real strength in the majority’s interpretive
argument is generality. The majority opinion convinces by showing
55. Id. at 173.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 176. However, the majority did make the point that the record
demonstrated no actual knowledge of the restrictive definition of burglary in the policies.
See id. at 176–77. Had such knowledge been shown, the result might well have been
different.
60. Id. at 176–77.
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how the strategy of argument that it employs in the instant case is
consistent with what courts are doing in other departments of law. From
common law sales contracts61 to common law leases62 to transactions
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,63 the majority used
decisions64 from various departments of law to make the case that the
present decision fit within a wide fabric of decisions. It is the feature of
generality that enables the majority opinion to favor the historical
argument over its textual counterpart.
C. Constitutional Law
In the American legal system, no department of law is more contested
than constitutional law. Theories of constitutional law are numerous and
wide ranging. Notwithstanding the plethora of theoretical approaches to
constitutional law, there is general consensus that the forms of argument
outlined above are the grammar for advancement and assessment of
constitutional claims.65
I will discuss a single opinion of the United States Supreme Court to
illustrate the claims made earlier regarding the forms of argument and
the role of interpretation in law. While questions in constitutional law
are often unique, there is nothing special about the forms of argument in
constitutional law. As mentioned earlier, the forms of argument at
common law were the very thing that enabled the early Supreme Court
to interpret the written Constitution. Thus, everything we learn about
interpretation in constitutional law is, ceteris paribus, equally applicable
to other departments of law.
The late nineteen twenties through the nineteen thirties were a time of
great economic turbulence in the United States. Over the course of a
decade, state legislatures were repeatedly called upon to stave off the
harsh effects of economic depression and widespread fiscal misery.
Particularly hard hit by financial crises were American citizens in the
middle class, who saw their very ability to shelter their families put at
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id. at 179.
63. Id. at 179–80 (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 93
(N.J. 1960)).
64. The majority cited both Iowa precedents and persuasive precedents from other
jurisdictions. Id. at 178–79.
65. See THOMAS E. BAKER & JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 307–36
(2d ed. 2003); PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 33 (4th ed. 2000).
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risk. In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature passed the Mortgage Moratorium
Law. In an effort to mitigate the harsh effects of numerous mortgage
foreclosures, the Mortgage Moratorium Law extended the period of time
for redemption of property for up to two years, to May 1, 1935.66
66. The pertinent section of the statute reads:
Sec. 4. Period of Redemption May be Extended.—Where any mortgage
upon real property has been foreclosed and the period of redemption has not
yet expired, or where a sale is hereafter had, in the case of real estate mortgage
foreclosure proceedings, now pending, or which may hereafter be instituted
prior to the expiration of two years from and after the passage of this Act, or
upon the sale of any real property under any judgment or execution where the
period of redemption has not yet expired, or where such sale is made hereafter
within two years from and after the passage of this Act, the period of
redemption may be extended for such additional time as the court may deem
just and equitable but in no event beyond May 1st, 1935; provided that the
mortgagor, or the owner in possession of said property, in the case of mortgage
foreclosure proceedings, or the judgment debtor, in case of sale under judgment, or
execution, shall prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, apply to the
district court having jurisdiction of the matter, on not less than 10 days’ written
notice to the mortgagee or judgment creditor, or the attorney of either, as the
case may be, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income on
said property, or, if the property has no income, then the reasonable rental
value of the property involved in such sale, and directing and requiring such
mortgagor or judgment debtor, to pay all or a reasonable part of such income
or rental value, in or toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage
or judgment indebtedness at such times and in such manner as shall be fixed
and determined and ordered by the court; and the court shall thereupon hear
said application and after such hearing shall make and file its order directing
the payment by such mortgagor, or judgment debtor, of such an amount at such
times and in such manner as to the court shall, under all the circumstances,
appear just and equitable. Provided that upon the service of the notice or
demand aforesaid that the running of the period of redemption shall be tolled
until the court shall make its order upon such application. Provided, further,
however, that if such mortgagor or judgment debtor, or personal representative,
shall default in the payments, or any of them, in such order required, on his
part to be done, or commits waste, his right to redeem from said sale shall
terminate 30 days after such default and holders of subsequent liens may
redeem in the order and manner now provided by law beginning 30 days after
the filing of notice of such default with the clerk of such District Court, and his
right to possession shall cease and the party acquiring title to any such real
estate shall then be entitled to the immediate possession of said premises. If
default is claimed by allowance of waste, such 30 day period shall not begin to
run until the filing of an order of the court finding such waste. Provided,
further, that the time of redemption from any real estate mortgage foreclosure
or judgment or execution sale heretofore made, which otherwise would expire
less than 30 days after the passage and approval of this Act, shall be and the
same hereby is extended to a date 30 days after the passage and approval of
this Act, and in such case, the mortgagor, or judgment debtor, or the assigns or
personal representative of either, as the case may be, or the owner in the
possession of the property, may, prior to said date, apply to said court for and
the court may thereupon grant the relief as hereinbefore and in this section
provided. Provided, further, that prior to May 1, 1935, no action shall be
maintained in this state for a deficiency judgment until the period of
redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of
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In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the United States
Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law.67 Pursuant to the statute, the
Blaisdells applied for an extension of the redemption period on the
foreclosure of a mortgage they had given on land they owned in
Minneapolis.68 The mortgage had been properly foreclosed: the appellant
and mortgagee was the purchaser of the mortgage at the foreclosure
sale.69 The Blaisdells applied for relief under the statute prior to the
running of the period of equitable redemption, the time during which
they were legally permitted to retain ownership of land by paying the
mortgagee/purchaser the sum of $3,700.98.70 The reasonable value of
the property, the Court stated, “greatly exceeded the amount due on the
mortgage including all liens, costs and expenses.”71
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Minnesota statute, finding the statute to be a constitutionally permissible
exercise of Minnesota’s police power.72 The question of the statute’s
constitutionality hinged on the question of whether or not the statute
violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.73 In the end, a
divided U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Minnesota statute was
constitutional. There is much in the opinion to be learned about
constitutional interpretation and the role of the forms of argument in
showing the truth of propositions of law.
The Court put the question as one of “the relation of emergency to
constitutional power”74 and began with the observation that “[w]hile
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion
this Act, has expired.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 417 n.1 (1934) (quoting
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, ch. 339 § 4, 1933 Minn. Laws 514).
67. Id. at 415–16.
68. Id. at 418–19.
69. Id. at 419.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 420.
73. Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 reads:
No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any
Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
74. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425.
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for the exercise of power.”75 In deciding the scope and limits of power,
the Court must discern the proper relationship between the power sought
to be exercised and constitutional limits on that exercise of power. For
this, the Court needed to construct the meaning of the Contract Clause.
To do this, the Court turned to the forms of legal argument.
The majority began with an historical narrative. History tells us why
the ratifiers or framers propounded a constitutional clause and what
purpose that clause was meant to serve. The majority maintained that
notwithstanding the failure of a clear answer to emerge from the debates
in the Constitutional Convention, there could be no doubt as to the
reasons which led to adoption of the clause. The Court explained:
The widespread distress following the revolutionary period, and the plight of
debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for
the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legislative
interferences had been so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to
prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was
threatened. . . . The occasion and general purpose of the contract clause are
summed up in the terse statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. pp. 213, 354, 355: “The power of changing the relative situation of
debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to
every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual
in those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management,
had been used to such an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the
ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man.
This mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial
intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the
people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance
of the evil was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the
virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected
from a reform of the government.”76

This history runs directly counter to the decision the Court ultimately
reached. In this regard, the dissenting opinion—written by Justice
Sutherland—is particularly instructive. Sutherland was adamant that the
historical form of argument was decisive in answering the question of
the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute. In constructing the meaning
of the Constitution, Justice Sutherland argued: “[t]he whole aim of
construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to discover
the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers and
the people who adopted it.”77 Constitutional interpretation is a matter of
“plac[ing] ourselves in the condition of those who framed and adopted
it.”78 Doing so, Sutherland maintained, “will demonstrate conclusively
75. Id. at 426.
76. Id. at 427–28.
77. Id. at 453 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S.
662, 670 (1889)).
78. Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
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that [the Contract Clause] was framed and adopted with the specific and
studied purpose of preventing legislation designed to relieve debtors
especially in time of financial distress.”79
The weight of history, so thoroughly recited by Justice Sutherland in
dissent, meant that the majority opinion had to persuade on some
basis other than history. For this, Chief Justice Hughes employed a variety
of forms of argument to show why the Minnesota statute survived
constitutional challenge. His primary arguments were two: doctrinal and
prudential. First, ample precedent exists for the proposition that “the
protective power of the State, its police power, may be exercised—without
violating the true intent of the provision of the Federal Constitution—in
directly preventing the immediate and literal enforcement of contractual
obligations, by a temporary and conditional restraint, where vital public
interests would otherwise suffer.” 80 The example Hughes provided was
a series of New York cases where the state extended the periods for
residential leases during a housing crisis as long as current residents paid
“a reasonable rent or price for their use and occupation.”81 These cases
set the stage for the majority’s most important argument: the prudential
argument.
Finding an emergency existing in Minnesota, the Court granted that
the end sought by the State is worthy of protection. But the key question
was the means. Could the Court have found that the end of “protection of a
basic interest of society”82 could be accomplished without compromising
the Court’s obligation to state the law and not remake it according to its own
lights? Having recited a variety of considerations—historical, doctrinal, and
prudential—Chief Justice Hughes drew the opinion to a conclusive end.
Taking judicial notice of the emergency condition in Minnesota, the
majority concluded that the statute was addressed to a legitimate end
(that is, it was within the police power). Now Hughes needed to persuade
that the end sought is legitimate, and that the means employed to achieve
that end was constitutionally permissible. His argument is an entirely
prudential one. First, he noted that the period of time for extension of
the period of redemption was not unreasonable. Second, the integrity of
79. Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Further bolstering his point, Sutherland recited
a number of nineteenth and twentieth century Supreme Court precedents where the Court
found debtor relief statutes unconstitutional. Id. at 465–66 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 440. This situation, according to the Court, involved debtor relief and
leases in the context of scarce housing. See id. at 440–43.
81. Id. at 440–41.
82. Id. at 445.
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the mortgage interest was in no way impaired. Third, the mortgagor was
required to pay the rental value of the land, which amount was added to
the indebtedness. Finally, the legislation was temporary, limited to the
period of the exigency.
Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion is a model of the interpretive principle
of minimal mutilation. Once it had concluded that the police power was
legitimate, the majority had to decide whether the exercise of that power
could be accomplished in a way that recognized the power of both the
textual and historical arguments that were at the center of the dissent.
The success of the majority’s interpretive argument turned on its ability
to cabin the ill effects of trampling the clear language of the Contracts
Clause. The majority’s appreciation of this was evident in its attempt to
emphasize the existence of a unique emergency situation and the very
limited scope of the remedy that the decision afforded the respondents.
V. CONCLUSION
Law is a practice of argument. In the day to day practice of law, legal
questions often admit of one right answer. Philosophy clarifies the
practice of law when it engenders a clear view of the grammar of legal
argument—the techniques employed by lawyers to settle disputed
questions within a shared, conventional practice.83
The forms of argument are a central feature of the practice of law. But
the forms of legal argument do not answer the question of what is to be
done when they conflict, thereby engendering the need for interpretation.
For this, we need to illuminate how it is that lawyers interpret the law
when the forms of argument pull in opposing directions.
The forms of argument are immanent in the practice of law. As we
have seen, the same is true of interpretation. The principles of minimal
mutilation, coherence and generality are the hermeneutic tools of legal
interpretation. In bringing these interpretive principles to light, it has not
been my purpose to argue for a particular theory of interpretation.
Rather, my aim has been to clarify what we already know and obtain a
clearer view of what we do when, perforce, we interpret the law.
Clarity with respect to interpretation in law engenders a deeper
understanding of the role of argument in law. Interpretation in law has
purpose only because the possibility exists that we can persuade others
83. Or, as Jules Coleman puts it: “playing the game ‘law’.” COLEMAN, supra note
20, at 143. See also CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 24, at 34 (“[I]f you
believe the holdings of a court, insofar as they are constructions of the Constitution, are
not statements about the world, but are moves within a serious game, movements as
practised [sic] as any classical ballet and yet no less contingent, then reductionism is out
of the question.”).
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to embrace our interpretations and that we are, ourselves, likewise capable
of being persuaded. Interpretation, while not foundational, is certainly
essential; without it, we could not preserve the common fabric of beliefs
and dispositions that make law possible.
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